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I. INTRODUCTION
The last part of the 20th Century witnessed an explosion in the use of
alternate dispute resolution to settle claims. 1 Frustrated or simply hampered
by the extraordinary time and expense involved in judicial determination of
disputes, potential litigants have found in alternate dispute resolution a
system where disputes can be finally and fairly resolved in a simple and
speedy process.2 Parties, by private contractual agreement, have great
flexibility to choose a resolution method that parties believe is fair and
impartial using neutrals with particular expertise in the area of dispute.
3
Indeed, flexibility is limited only by the imagination of the contracting
parties.
Arbitration is the method of dispute resolution whereby parties submit
their disputes to the judgment of one or more persons outside of the judicial
process for binding and final resolution. 4 Congress and the courts favor
arbitration, "a creature of contract," as a quick and inexpensive alternative to
ordinary litigation. 5 Where an independent basis for federal jurisdiction
exists, arbitration contracts are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,
6
which requires federal district courts to recognize and enforce private
agreements to submit disputes to arbitration.7 Analogously, most states have
I For example, arbitration in the nonunion employment context was rare until the
early 1990s. RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT
IN EMPLOYMENT 1 (1997). Since then, however, employment arbitration has become "the
cornerstone of national labor policy," Marshall W. Grate, Binding Arbitration of
Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 699, 719
(1993); "an idea whose time has come," Richard A. Bales & Reagan Burch, The Future
of Employment Arbitration in the Nonunion Sector, 45 LAB. L.J. 627, 635 (1994); and
"here to stay" as a method of resolving employment disputes, Ronald Turner,
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims with Special Reference to
the Three A 's-Access, Adjudication and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231,
294 (1996).
2 See MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 10
(2000).
3 For a discussion of volantariness and consent in arbitration, see Stephen J. Ware,
Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996).
4 See LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 2 (2000); Matthew N.
Chappell, Arbitrate ... and Avoid Stomach Ulcers, 2 ARB. MAG. Nos. 11-12, 6, 7
(1944).
5 Fils Et Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 243
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1999).
6 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
7 See 9 U.S.C. § 4; RICHARD D. ENGLISH, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
LITIGATOR'S HANDBOOK 101 (Nancy F. Atlas et al. eds., 2000).
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enacted some form of the Uniform Arbitration Act as the basis of arbitral
regulation and judicial enforcement of agreements in the absence of
independent federal jurisdictional grounds.8
Various provisions in the FAA have been hotly litigated in the nearly
eighty years since the statute's inception.9  Supreme Court decisions
resolving these issues overwhelmingly and consistently demonstrate a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration and encouraging private contractual
agreements to submit disputes to arbitration for resolution. 10 One area in
8 See JAMES J. TANSEY, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR T14E 1990s 43 (Richard J.
Medalie ed., 1991); see also Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-in "for Judicial Review of Errors of
Law Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263 (1997)
(reporting that 35 states have enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act and 14 other states
have substantially similar laws). For an extensive discussion of the UAA and the state
role in commercial arbitration, see Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration
Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REv. 175 (2002).
9See generally Dennis R. Nolan, Employment Arbitration After Circuit City, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript on file with author). Examples include
the application of choice-of-law clauses (see Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt,
Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2250 (2002)
[hereinafter Unnecessary Choice]), the § I "contracts of employment" exclusion, (see
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 531 U.S. 105, 112 (2001)), the requisite threshold of
procedural fairness as a precondition to judicial enforcement (see Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999)), arbitrator qualification and neutrality
(see Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985, 994-95 (S.D. Ind.
2001)); Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By How Much? Questions Gilmer Did
Not Answer, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 589, 601-13 (2001), access to discovery
(compare, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Mason, 87 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)
(enforcing arbitration agreement that did not provide for any discovery) with Kinney v.
United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1332, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 355
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that restrictions on discovery "work to curtail the
employee's ability to substantiate any claim against" the employer); see also Geiger, 134
F. Supp. 2d at 996 ("limited discovery, controlled by a potentially biased arbitration
panel," creates unfairness which renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable), and the
allocation of fees (see, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d
549, 556-57 (4th Cir. 2001) (fee-splitting provision which required employee to share
costs of arbitration does not per se render an arbitration agreement unenforceable);
Williams v. CIGNA Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999) (enforcing arbitral
award which, among other things, imposed a $3,150 forum fee on plaintiff); Shankle v.
B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce
arbitration agreement that required employee to pay for one-half of the arbitration fees)).
The Supreme Court may have given some indirect guidance on the fee issue when it held,
in a case brought under the Truth in Lending Act, that an arbitration agreement that does
not mention arbitration costs and fees is not per se unenforceable. Green Tree Fin. Corp. -
Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000).
10 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (affirming the
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which the Supreme Court has been silent, however, is that of expanded
judicial intervention in the review and vacatur of arbitral awards."l
Judicial review, vacatur, and/or modification of arbitral awards are
governed by sections 9, 10 and 11 of the FAA. 12 Judicial award confirmation
and review can only commence where parties have so provided in the arbitral
agreement. 13 Even where such an agreement is present, the stringent
guidelines of the FAA constrain a federal district reviewing court, which may
vacate and/or modify an award only in the extremely narrow circumstances
delineated in the statute. 14 Since a 1953 Supreme Court decision 15 opened
the door for judicial review under a "manifest disregard of the law standard,"
courts have cautiously instituted limited non-statutory grounds for judicial
lower court's decision that a, claim under the ADEA could be subjected to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) ("We have
previously held that the FAA's proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to
the wishes of the contracting parties."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
(holding that the FAA, which makes contractual arbitration provisions enforceable, is
binding on states and preempts state law which would otherwise invalidate such
provisions); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (requiring that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration"); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) ("[Als with any other contract, the parties'
intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of
arbitrability.").
11 See Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration:
Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for
Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 443, 451 (1998).
12 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1999).
13 See§9.
14 See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.
1995). The FAA allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitration award in limited
circumstances, including "[wihere the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means"; "[w]here there [existed] evident partiality or corruption [by] the arbitrators";
where there existed specified misconduct by the arbitrators, or "[w]here the arbitrators
exceeded their powers." 9 U.S.C. § 10. For a comprehensive discussion of the standards
governing judicial review of arbitral awards, see Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:
Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731
(1996).
15 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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award vacatur. 16 In reality, however, vacatur under any standard is granted
only in the rarest of circumstances.17
Parties attracted to the speed, efficiency and economy of the arbitration
process are often disturbed about the, finality of the decision.' 8 Concerned
that the neutral may in fact be biased toward one party, especially in the
employment or consumer context where arbitrators with specialized
knowledge may be well known to one of the parties who has utilized their
services in the past, or perhaps simply comfortable with the traditional
judicial litigation route of dispute resolution where one appeal is normally a
matter of right, parties have increasingly written into their arbitration
contracts clauses expanding the scope of judicial review statutorily
provided. 19 Although many courts enforce such agreements under section 9
of the FAA, at least one court has refused, disapproving of parties' ability to
circumvent the spirit and intent of the law by contracting around it.20
The silence of the Supreme Court, coupled with the inconsistent lower
court decisions, creates uncertainty and current tension in arbitration law. 21
Absent Congressional intervention in the near future, the validity of private
arbitration agreements expanding grounds for judicial review must be settled
if the federal policy favoring arbitration is to be effectuated by disputants
continuing to choose arbitration as their dispute resolution method of choice.
Most Americans trust the judicial system and value their "day in court"
as a birthright of strong importance. 22 In our overburdened judicial system,
16 See Edgar H. Brenner, The Enforcement of Arbitration Awards, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE LITIGATOR'S HANDBOOK 95 (Nancy F. Atlas et al. eds., 2000).
17 See Stephan J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 724 (1999). For a thorough discussion of
how courts apply both the statutory (e.g., bias, misconduct, or corruption on the part of
the arbitrator) and non-statutory (e.g., manifest disregard) grounds for judicial review of
arbitration awards, see Hayford, supra note 11.
18 This is particularly true with regard to statutory claims, since individuals "have
the right... to an effective vindication of their statutory rights." Nolan, supra note 9, at
II-D; see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 447-54 (1999).
19 See infra Part III.
20 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that parties to an arbitration agreement may not contractually alter judicial standard of
review of award).
21 See id. at 933-35.
22 John M. Burman, The Role of Clinical Legal Education in Developing the Rule of
Law in Russia, 2 Wyo. L. REV. 89, 110 (2002) (noting that in Russia, as in the United
States, "the perception of having been treated fairly, of having had one's day in court, is
often more important than" an adjudicative outcome).
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however, many disputing parties are relieved when disputes can be fairly
settled without complex and expensive litigation. 23 The Rules of Civil
Procedure, for instance, provide ample opportunity for judges to take active
roles in encouraging settlement and alternate dispute resolution.24
It is precisely that lack of active judicial participation that has led to a
view that commercial arbitration is a sort of second-class "frontier" justice in
which participants cannot place the same amount of confidence that they
might in the traditional judicial system.25 Losers, with the perception that
justice can only be secured in the end by resort to court review, inevitably
suspect the fairness and rigor of the arbitral process. 26 The conventional
wisdom that a reviewing court is the insurer of accuracy and fairness of
results of dispute resolution, whatever the form, has a destabilizing effect on
the institution of commercial arbitration. 27 Many parties drawn to the
simplicity and benefits of commercial arbitration nonetheless are
uncomfortable with the idea that "a deal is still a deal regardless of the
outcome." 28 One way to make sure that such an outcome is grounded in
correct legal interpretation is to provide contractually for expanded judicial
review. Not a "second bite at the apple" as some commentators have
alleged, 29 these contractual provisions provide for expanded review
regardless of which party prevails, thereby sharing the risk and, at the same
time, ensuring the fairness of the process.
Until 2001, the circuits directly deciding the validity of clauses
expanding judicial review of arbitral awards agreed that both the liberal
federal policy favoring private contracts to arbitrate and the purpose of the
FAA to effectuate and ensure enforcement of the parties' agreements
required that courts recognize and enforce such agreements and review
23 BALES, supra note 1, at 154-57 (explaining the benefits of reduced costs to the
parties of employment arbitration agreements).
24 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (giving district court judges the discretion to call a
pretrial conference to facilitate settlement of a case).
25 See Hayford, supra note 11, at 499; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:
Community and Coercion Under The Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 956
(1999) (criticizing consumer and employment arbitration as coercive and characterizing
such arbitration as "rustic justice"); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration
of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L.
REv. 1017, 1036-49 (1996) (criticizing arbitration for, among other things, lack of due
process protections).
26 See Hayford, supra note 11, at 447, 495.
27 Id. at 495.
28 Id. at 500.
29 Id. at 495.
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arbitral decisions using standards provided by the contract.30 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed in 2001, however, finding that parties cannot by agreement
order the judiciary to engage in review contrary to statutory authority. 31
These cases reflect tensions at both the theoretical and practical levels.
The courts that conclude that parties should not be permitted to draft their
own judicial review clauses emphasize a strict construction of the FAA's
statutory language, and interpret that language as creating mandatory rules
governing judicial review.32 These courts also argue that such an
interpretation is necessary to insulate arbitration from judicial interference
and, at a more practical level, to maintain the principal advantages of
arbitration-its speed and relatively low cost-which depend in large part on
extremely limited judicial review. 33 On the other hand, the courts that
conclude that parties should be permitted to draft their own judicial review
clauses emphasize the advantages of freedom of contract, and argue that this
freedom encourages the use of arbitration by giving parties the flexibility to
contract for expanded review if they so desire. 34
This article argues that courts should enforce private contractual
agreements for expanded judicial review in arbitration agreements. This
article demonstrates that the court decisions enforcing such arbitral
contractual provisions are consistent with the FAA's purpose to ensure
enforcement of parties' arbitral agreements, whatever the form. Furthermore,
this article argues that the FAA does not preclude courts from reviewing
awards under expanded grounds where parties so agree, because the statutory
structure provides default rather than mandatory grounds for award vacatur.
Finally, this article concludes that permitting the parties to contract for
expanded judicial review serves the public policy favoring arbitration,
insofar as it encourages arbitration by giving parties who may be
extraordinarily concerned with obtaining the legally correct outcome the
ability to contract for expanded judicial review.
30 See Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2001); Syncor
Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS.27375 (4th Cir. 1997);
Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Tech.,
Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995); Fits Et Cables
D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
31 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936-37 (10th Cir. 2001).
32 See, e.g., id. at 934-35.
33 See, e.g., id. at 936 n.7.
34 See, e.g., Hughes Training, 254 F.3d at 588; Synchor Int'l, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27375, at *5; Lapine Tech., 130 F.3d at 888; Gateway Tech., 64 F.3d at 993;
Midland Metals, 584 F. Supp. at 243.
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Part II of this article provides both a historical and statutory context for
the controversy. Part III summarizes court decisions both recognizing and
rejecting the enforceability of contractual provisions in arbitral agreements
expanding judicial review beyond the scope of the FAA. Part IV analyzes the
legitimacy of private contractual provisions expanding judicial review in
light of the American tradition of freedom to contract, the legislative purpose
and statutory framework of the FAA, and consistency with the internal
function of the arbitral process. Part V concludes.
II. ARBITRATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Historical Background
Probably as old as human society itself, the use of arbitration dates back
to ancient history.3 5 In medieval England it was the sole remedy for business
merchants, and furnished almost exclusively the tribunals for commercial
dispute settlement. 36 The finality of arbitration decisions was well suited to
the commercial setting.3 7 Dispute resolution was swift, and parties who
tended to meet again and again in this forum believed that if they lost this
particular dispute, they might win the next time around.3 8 In addition, the
arbitrator selected by the parties was familiar with the unique concerns of the
particular business setting.39
Today, arbitration is widely employed in a variety of settings; it is used
most traditionally for labor disputes and in the commercial setting where
merchants familiar with contract execution and needing speedy and
inexpensive decisions to disputes still find this forum invaluable. 40
Arbitration also is increasingly common in employment and consumer
settings where speedy resolution allows a swift return to the status quo
ante.
4 1
Typically, dispute arbitration is arrived at in one of two ways: by demand
or by submission. 42 Arbitration by demand arises where parties to a contract
35 See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law,
12 VA. L. REV. 265, 266 (1926).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 269.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See COOPER, supra note 4, at 6-7.
41 See EDNA I. ELKOURI & FRANK ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 3 (Marlin
M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997).
42 See JASPER, supra note 2, at 10-11.
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prospectively provide in their agreement that any disputes arising out of the
performance of that contract will be resolved by binding arbitration. 43 Thus
the parties, by their contract, bargain for judgment by neutral arbitrators
rather than the court. 44 Arbitration, therefore, is wholly dependent upon a
bargained-for agreement between parties; and parties cannot be compelled to
submit a dispute to arbitration unless they have agreed as such.45
Furthermore, parties contract for the procedural aspects of the arbitration.46
In this scenario, one of the contracting parties may file a Demand for
Arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause when a dispute arises. 47
Arbitration by submission, in contrast, refers to the arbitration of an
existing controversy where the parties agree to resolve the dispute by this
method. 48 Resulting decisions may be non-binding, but binding decisions are
a typical feature of this method of alternate dispute resolution.49 Both types
of arbitration usually comprise a process whereby the impartial third-party
arbitrator or arbitrator panel considers the arguments of both sides in an
arena similar to, but less formal than, a trial. 50 Discovery and witnesses
43 Id.
44 See Fils Et Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
45 Id. at 244; First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995)
("[A] party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed to submit
to arbitration.... ."); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985) ("[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to
determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.").
46 See Midland Metals, 584 F. Supp. at 245 ("[T]he arbitrator's factual findings shall
be conclusive ... so long as they are supported by substantial evidence."); Unnecessary
Choice, supra note 9, at 2250 ("[P]arties dictate the terms of their own contracts, and the
FAA does no more than ensure that those terms are enforced."); see also id at 2253
("[Tihe federal interest begins, and ends, with ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms .... "); Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr.,
489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) ("There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain
set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according
to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate."); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 625
("The 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements' manifested by [9 U.S.C.
§ 2] and the Act as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of
private contractual arrangements: the Act simply 'creates a body of federal substantive
law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate."' (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 25 n.32 (1983))
(citation omitted).
47 Midland Metals, 584 F. Supp. at 245.
48 See JASPER, supra note 2, at 11.
49 STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 4.32 (2001).
50 Id. at 265-66.
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often are limited, and the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure
typically do not apply.51
B. The Congressional Enactment of the FAA
Traditionally, English jurists and their early American counterparts
viewed the arbitration process with suspicion and fear that their judicial
authority would be undermined. 52 Indeed, early American courts held that
the judiciary lacked the power to compel the performance of arbitration
contracts and determined that public policy did not favor final and conclusive
arbitration. 53 The courts, therefore, either questioned their ability to enforce
or flatly refused to enforce arbitration awards. 54
In response to such pervasive judicial hostility, several state legislatures
enacted laws directing courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate, culminating
with the 1925 Congressional passage of the United States Arbitration Act,
now codified to as the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").55 The adoption of
the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1956, now applicable in most states,
permitted speedy enforcement of arbitration contracts in state courts. 56 The
purpose of the federal legislation was to ensure the enforcement of arbitration
agreements involving interstate commerce and maritime transactions. 57
51 See James J. Tansey, The Principal differences between Arbitration and
Litigation, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990's 42-43 (Richard J. Medalie ed.,
1991).
52 See COOPER, supra note 4, at 3.
53 See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (D. Mass. 1845) (No.
14,065) (holding that specific performance of the agreement is not a right which a party
can demand from a court of equity and that it is public policy not to force parties to
submit to arbitration).
54 Id.
55 See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 35, at 266.
56 See Tansey, supra note 51, at 43; see also Ware, supra note 8, at 263 (reporting
that 35 states have enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act and 14 other states have
substantially similar laws). For an extensive discussion of the UAA and the state role in
commercial arbitration, see Stephen J. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration
Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration 54 FLA. L. REv. 175, 208-26
(2002).
57 See Erika Van Ausdall, Confirmation of Arbitral Awards: The Confusion
Surrounding Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 49 DRAKE L. REv. 41, 45 (2000);
Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act: An
Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 283 (1996).
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Congress' specific intent in enacting the FAA was to guarantee judicial
enforcement of private arbitration agreements. 58
C. The Structure of the FAA
The FAA provides that agreements to settle disputes by arbitration shall
be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" where the contract involves
commerce among the states, territories, and the District of Columbia or with
foreign nations or in maritime transactions.5 9 Contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, and workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce are specifically excluded from the Act's coverage. 60 The
exclusion is narrowly construed, and thus, the Act is interpreted to cover
prospective agreements for dispute arbitration in the employment contracts of
all workers not specifically excluded.61
Furthermore, the FAA confers on the federal judiciary the ability to stay
trial of any dispute where a party applies for such a stay and where the issue
to be tried is referable to arbitration under a written agreement.62 The party
seeking to enforce the contractual arbitration clause may then move the court
to direct arbitration to proceed in the manner provided in the agreement.
The FAA does not create independent federal jurisdiction,63 however,
and a federal court may act only when jurisdiction has been established under
Title 28.64 But the Supreme Court has held that the Act creates a body of
substantive federal law governing arbitration agreements within its
coverage. 65 The FAA creates no new rights, but only provides a remedy to
enforce an already existing arbitration agreement.66
In addition to mandatory judicial enforcement of awards where parties
so contract in their arbitration agreements, 67 Congress, in the FAA, provided
58 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)
(quoting Volt info. Sci. Inc., v. Bd. of Tr., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
59 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
60 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
61 See generally Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114 (2001)
(holding that arguments contesting the applicability of the FAA to a particular
employment contract must be premised on the language in section one).
62 See 9 U.S.C.§ 3 (2000).
63 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
65 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1995)).
66 Id.
67 Id.
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for judicial vacatur and modification of awards68 in extremely limited
circumstances. 69 The limited judicial review provided by statute renders
binding arbitration decisions non-reviewable in all but the rarest of
situations.7 0
The FAA is comprised of fourteen sections consisting of three
classifications of provisions. 7' IFirst, "front-end" issues address concerns that
arise before the commencement of arbitration, such as determinations of
substantive arbitrability. 72 Next, procedural issues, such as the availability of
pre-hearing discovery, govern the arbitration process itself.73 Finally, "back
end" issues, such as judicial confirmation, vacatur and modification of
awards, deal with post-arbitration issues and effectuate the result of the
arbitration process. 74
The act addresses "front-end" issues where the arbitration contract
involves commerce or a maritime provision by mandating that such contracts
are valid and enforceable by courts. 75 In addition, the Act directs courts, not
only to order that any arbitration proceed in the manner so agreed, but also to
stay any trial on the action until the agreed arbitration is completed. 76
Various "housekeeping" procedural issues, addressed in the Act include
directing the court to appoint an arbitrator where not so designated by the
parties. 77 The Act also confers subpoena powers on arbitrators, allowing
them to compel witness attendance at the proceedings. 78
The "back-end" issues, involving controversies arising after the
completion of the arbitration proceedings, are addressed in sections 9 through
14 of the FAA.79 Section 9 provides mandatory judicial award confirmation
triggered only when "the parties in their agreement have agreed that a
judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the
68 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
69 See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2000) (establishing grounds for judicial modification of
arbitral awards).
70 See Ware, supra note 17, at 711.
71 See generally Stephan L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The
Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 67, 74.
72 See generally id.
73 Id. at 76.
7 4 /d. at 74-75.
75 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
76 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
77 See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
78 See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
79 See Hayford, supra note 71, at 74.
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arbitration. '80 Section 9 also provides that, if one of the parties to the
arbitration applies to the court specified in the agreement, or in the absence
of specification, the federal district court in which the award was made
within one year after the award for an order confirming the award, "the court
must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected
as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 ... 81
D. Award Vacatur and Modification Under the FAA
Modification and/or correction of arbitral awards is available under
section 11 and only at the discretion of the court.82 The district court may
make an order modifying or correcting the award, under section 11, where
there is a material miscalculation of figures or description, where an award is
made upon a matter not at issue, or where the award is imperfect in form.83
These modifications may be made to effectuate the intent of the parties or to
ensure that justice is done. 84
Section 10 provides the standards for arbitral award vacatur.85 The FAA
provides that the federal district court in the geographic locale in which the
award was made has the ability and may vacate an arbitration award and, at
its discretion, order a rehearing only in the following limited circumstances:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by..
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.86
A textualist reading of section 10 demonstrates a Congressional attempt
to protect the proceedings against any misconduct by parties or neutrals that
80 See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
81 Id.
82 See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2000).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
86 See id.
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would result in an unfair proceeding, against a proceeding that resolved
issues that the parties did not contract to arbitrate, or one that did not result in
a final outcome and award.87 Nothing on the face of the statute demonstrates
a Congressional intent to insulate the parties against error of fact, law, or
contract by arbitrators that result in inaccurate or unfair awards. 88 The statute
does not explicitly permit the court to engage in a review of the merits of the
case. Likewise, there are no guarantees of correctness of awards or justice for
the parties. Rather, the provisions are procedural rather than protectionist in
nature.89
The courts strictly construe section 10 provisions, and parties attempting
to compel judicial award vacatur by capitalizing on any ambiguities in the
statute to mandate award vacatur are for the most part frustrated. 90 Most
section 10 litigation involves section 10(a)(4), under which authority parties
petition reviewing courts to examine the merits of the case for errors of law
or fact in an attempt to prove that the award requires vacatur because the
arbitrators "exceeded their power." 91 Courts have declined the invitation to
broadly construe section 10(a)(4). 92 Generally, the courts instead hold that an
arbitrator's authority is conferred by the arbitral contract. 93 A mere error of
reasoning or law neither divests that power nor causes that power to be
exceeded.94 Courts hold that a commercial arbitration award can be vacated
87 See Hayford, supra note 11, at 450.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See Ware, supra note 17, at 711, 724-25.
91 See Hayford, supra note 11, at 455.
92 See, e.g., Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1991)
("We have consistently accorded the narrowest reading to section 10[(a)(4)] .... ");
Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("It is particularly
necessary to accord the 'narrowest of readings' to the excess-of-authority provision of
section 10[(a)(4)].") (citations omitted).
93 See Davis, 667 F.2d at 165. The Davis court stated:
Arbitration is... a matter of contract, and the contours of the arbitrator's authority in
a given case are determined by reference to the arbitral agreement .... [T]he genesis of
arbitral authority is the contract, and arbitrators are permitted to decide only those issues
that lie within the contractual mandate. By necessary implication, an arbitral award
regarding a matter not within the scope of the governing arbitration clause is one made in
excess of authority, and a court is precluded from giving effect to such an award.
Id. at 165 (citations omitted); see also Hayford, supra note 11, at 455-57.
94 See, e.g, Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 640 A.2d 788, 793 (N.J
1994) (per curiam) ("'Basically, arbitration awards may be vacated only for fraud,
corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrators. [They] can be corrected
or modified only for very specifically defined mistakes as set forth in [section 2A:24-9 of
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under the "exceeded powers" standard only where the arbitrator exceeds the
scope of the contract in resolving issues, involves parties not contracted for,
or fails to comply with an express requirement of the parties.95
E. Nonstatutory Vacatur
For many years after the passage of the FAA, its vacatur standards were
the exclusive grounds upon which a court could review an award.96 The
Supreme Court has never directly determined whether the statutory vacatur
standards are exclusive or can be expanded. For the most part, courts have
strictly interpreted this portion of the FAA, meaning that if a confirmation
petition was properly before the court, the court was compelled to confirm
the award.97 But in the 1953 Supreme Court decision of Wilko v. Swan,98 the
Court implied, in dicta, that "manifest disregard of the law" by an arbitrator
would constitute an additional non-statutory ground for judicial vacatur of
arbitral decisions governed by the FAA.99 This, in turn, led federal courts to
consider additional grounds for judicial review and vacatur, in effect creating
a "federal common law of vacatur." 100
Federal case law, varied by circuit, now recognizes non-statutory
grounds for vacatur where the award is "arbitrary and capricious,"' 0'1 fails to
"draw its essence" from the parties' agreement, is contrary to established
the Act].' Id. at 793 (quoting Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d
364, 399 (N.J. 1992) (Wilentz, C.J., concurring))).
95 See, e.g., Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1256-57 (7th Cir.
1994); Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993);
Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co., 958 F.2d 258, 260-62 (9th Cir. 1992);
Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982).
96 See generally Hayford, supra note 11, at 462.
97 See Fils Et Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
98 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
99 The "manifest disregard of the law" nonstatutory ground for judicial vacatur is the
result of the following language in Wilko:
While it may be true... that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance
with the provision of the [law] would "constitute grounds for vacating the award
pursuant to section 10 [(a)] of the Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need
to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions ... the interpretations of
the law by arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts to judicial review for error in interpretation.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (citations omitted).
100 Hayford, supra note 11, at 492.
101 Id. at 450-51.
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public policy, is "completely irrational," or was derived by means of "a
manifest disregard of the law."102 Although the net result of these safeguards
is that the arbitrators must grant a fundamentally fair hearing to all parties, 10 3
the standards for vacatur are invariably high. This is illustrated by the
manifest disregard standard, which requires the reviewing court to find not
only a clear error of law, but also that the arbitrator had a correct knowledge
of the law and consciously ignored it.104 In addition, even though the circuits
may recognize nonstatutory grounds for vacatur, vacatur under these grounds
is rarely granted. 10 5 In fact, vacatur has been granted under the "manifest
disregard" nonstatutory standard in only one reported instance to date.10 6
Reviewing courts are further constrained by the lack or dearth of written
findings by the arbitrator.' 07 One commentator suggests that the lack of
reasoned awards is an intentional attempt by arbitrators to prevent courts
from usurping arbitral awards and to protect the integrity, purity, and finality
of their decision.10 8
102 See Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1997)).
103 See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A
Practical Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L.
REv. 591, 611 (1995).
104 See Hayford, supra note 11, at 467; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), quoted in Conntech
Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Conn. Educ. Props., Inc. 102 F.3d 677, 687 (2d Cir. 1996); Int'l
Telepassport Corp. v. U.S.F.I., Inc. 89 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); M & C
Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 1996); and cited in Advest,
Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990); Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935
F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[i]llustrative of the degree of 'disregard' necessary to
support vacatur under [the "manifest disregard"] standard is our holding that manifest
disregard will be found where an 'arbitrator "understood and correctly stated the law but
proceeded to ignore it .... (quoting Siegl v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir.
1985) (per curiam)); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972)
(stating that "if the arbitrators simply ignore the applicable law, the literal application of a
'manifest disregard' standard should presumably complete vacation of the award.").
105 See Ware, supra note 8, at 264.
106 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998); cf Progressive Data
Systems, Inc. v. Jefferson Randolph Corp., 568 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. July 15, 2002) (rejecting
the "manifest disregard" standard in a case arising under a Gerogia statute virtually
identical to the FAA).
107 See Hayford, supra note 11, at 475-76.
108 Id. at 446-47.
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III. CONTRACTS FOR EXPANDED REVIEW AND THE COURTS
The limited judicial review available on both statutory and non-statutory
grounds falls far short of that available upon appellate review of judicial trial
court decisions. Seeking to "have the best of both worlds," some creative
parties fashion both pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration contractual
clauses to provide for judicial review of the arbitrator's decision expanded
far beyond that envisioned in the FAA and related case law decisions. 109
Such contractual provisions, however, inevitably produce tension between
the freedom to fashion contracts as the parties see fit and the very thing that
makes arbitration attractive in the first place, the finality of the award.
A. Contractual Arbitral Agreements Trump FAA Review
Provisions
The earliest case to directly address whether parties to an arbitration
agreement can alter the nature of a federal court's role under the FAA arose
in 1984.110 In Fils Et Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp.,I II
parties to a commercial agreement included, within that contract, an
arbitration clause where they agreed to expand federal district court review of
any award to include the power to review whether the arbitrator's findings of
facts were supported by substantial evidence and whether the findings of law
should be affirmed, modified, or vacated. 112 Upon review, the district court
found that such an agreement was valid and reviewed the arbitrator's
findings accordingly, confirming part and rejecting part. 113 The court said
that such review was proper because of the contractual nature of the
arbitration agreement. 114 The court reasoned that since arbitration
agreements are wholly created by contract, absent a jurisdictional or public
policy barrier, there is no legal impediment to additional agreements to
expand judicial review beyond the FAA. 15 The court concluded that the
arbitration agreement in the case did not offend public policy because, even
109 See, e.g., Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97
(5th Cir. 1995).
110 See Fils Et Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
11 Id.
112 Id. at 242.
113 Id. at 247.
114 Id. at 244.
115 Id.
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though the purpose of arbitration is to avoid the time and expense involved in
invoking the judicial system to settle disputes, here the parties were only
invoking the court's review of an already-determined matter. 116 This type of
action, therefore, resulted in far less work for the court than full-blown
litigation would have." 17
B. FAA Vacatur Standards as Default Provisions
Prior to 2001, the only three Circuit Courts of Appeals to definitively
decide if parties could legally contract to expand judicial review of their
arbitration agreements held that private parties may agree to expand the
judicial standard of review. 118 In the first of these cases, the Fifth Circuit, in
Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,119 reviewed
a telecommunications dispute where the parties contracted that any disputes
arising from their joint business venture would be arbitrated with de novo
judicial review of errors of law. 120 When the parties petitioned the district
court for either confirmation or vacatur of the arbitral award, that court
affirmed the award in its entirety. 121 In so doing, the district court purported
to review the award applying the standards provided in the parties' contract,
but using less scrutiny than that of an appellate court reviewing a trial court's
decision, citing deference to the federal policy favoring arbitration. 122
The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, applied the parties' contractual review
standards, vacating the arbitral award of punitive damages, while otherwise
affirming the award. 123 That court, acknowledging that under the FAA the
district court's review of an arbitration award is usually extraordinarily
narrow, nevertheless concluded that the FAA provisions are default
provisions for judicial review that parties may expand by contract. 124 The
court focused on the contractual nature of the agreement which is to be
116 See Fils Et Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
117 Id.
118 See Synchor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, CA-95-965-1, 1997 WL 452245, at *6-7
(4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997); Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888
(9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97
(5th Cir. 1995).
119 Gateway, 64 F.3d at 993.
120 Id. at 995-96.
121 Id. at 996.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1001.
124 Id. at 997.
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enforced like any contract, noting that the Supreme Court has held that
arbitration under the FAA is a matter of consent and not coercion and that
parties are free to structure arbitration contractual provisions liberally
including the issues to be arbitrated and the rules to be utilized.' 25 While
arbitration does provide a vehicle to resolve disputes quickly, the basic
objective of the FAA is not expediency but the enforcement of commercial
contracts.1 26 The very purpose of the FAA is to put arbitration contracts on
the same footing as all contracts. 127 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, held that
contractual arbitration provisions providing for expanded judicial review
merely add to rather than circumvent the default provisions of section 10 of
the FAA. 128
C. Proceeding With Caution: A Middle Ground
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fifth and overturned a lower court's
refusal to review an arbitration award under a contractual arbitration
provision in the parties' agreement providing for judicial review of errors of
fact or law. 129 In Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.,130 the court
noted that the Supreme Court has enforced contract terms that have called for
arbitration conducted under agreements limiting the scope of issues
submitted for arbitration1 31 under rules other than those provided by the
FAA, 132 and under agreements to arbitrate punitive damages contrary to state
law.133 In light of these and other Supreme Court decisions emphasizing that
the primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure the enforcement of contracts to
arbitrate according to the terms of those agreements, the court reasoned that
it simply does not make sense to interpret the FAA as preventing the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under rules expanding its scope.
134
Thus the court held that federal courts may expand their review of an
125 See id. at 996-97 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514
U.S. 52 (1995)).
126 See id.
127 See id. at 997.
128 Id.
129 See Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
130 Id. at 888.
131 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
132 See Volt Info. Sci. v. Bd. of Tr., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
133 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 52 (1995).
134 See Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir.
1997).
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arbitration award beyond the FAA limited only by the extent to which. the
parties have so agreed. 135
Judge Kozinski, however, was more cautious in his concurrence. 136 He
pointed out that while the Supreme Court cases are helpful, none say that
"private parties may tell the federal courts how to conduct their business...
[or] impose on the federal courts burdens and functions that Congress has
withheld." 137 He reasoned, however, that since such a case must have an
independent jurisdictional basis to be in front of the federal court, enforcing
an arbitration agreement with enhanced judicial review consumes fewer
judicial resources than traditional litigation.138 He agreed that here, where the
basis for review contracted for by the parties was essentially the same as the
standard of review in appeals from administrative agencies, the bankruptcy
court, or habeas corpus appellants, review should proceed according to the
agreed terms. 139 The result would be different, however, if the standard of
review contracted for was unfamiliar or absurd.140 He acknowledged that the
FAA is not quite an express congressional authorization of expanded judicial
review under this agreement, but concluded that the policy of the Arbitration
Act to enforce parties' agreements sufficed to enforce this particular
contract. 14
1
The Fourth Circuit, in the unpublished decision of Synchor International
Corp. v. McLeland,142 followed both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. The
Synchor court affirmed a federal district court's order enforcing a final
arbitration award using the standard of review provided in the parties'
arbitration agreement which provided that "the arbitrator shall not have the
power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning and the award may be
vacated or corrected by judicial review for any such error." 143 Citing with
approval both Lapine and Gateway Technologies, the court followed the
reasoning of those cases and held that the contractual nature of arbitration
and the purpose of the FAA to enforce arbitration contracts require the
135 Id. at 889.






142 Synchor Int'l Corp. v, McLeland, CA-95-965-1, 1997 WL 452245, at *6-7 (4th
Cir. Aug. 11, 1997).
143 Id.
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Article 9 judicial review restrictions to be interpreted as default provisions
that parties may expand by mutual agreement. 144
D. 2001 Concurrence in the Employment Context
In 2001, the Fifth Circuit applied the reasoning of Gateway to a case
arising in the employment context and held that arbitration agreements may
expand judicial review beyond the scope of the FAA. 145 In Hughes Training,
Inc. v. Cook,146 Gracie Cook resigned her employment with Raytheon when,
upon return from sick leave due to a stroke, Raytheon required her to
complete a probationary period that had been imposed pre-illness due to sub-
standard performance. 147 Cook was precluded from litigating her claim by a
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreement that she had signed upon
hire.148 The agreement provided that all employment disputes would be
submitted to final and binding arbitration.' 49, Pursuant to this agreement,
Cook arbitrated her claims of discrimination and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.' 50 The arbitrator found for Cook on the emotional distress
claim, and Raytheon filed suit to vacate. 151 While the arbitration agreement
provided that either party could bring an action in a court of competent
jurisdiction to vacate arbitration, the standard of review to be applied to the
arbitrator's findings of facts and conclusions of law would be the same as
that applied by an appellate court reviewing a judicial bench trial
judgment.152 Raytheon, arguing that this standard of review was inconsistent
with the nature of the arbitration agreement and unconscionable, filed suit in
accordance with the FAA 153 to vacate the award.154 Finding that it was
lawful for the parties to contract for more expansive judicial review than that
provided statutorily and by case law, the district court performed the
contracted-for review. The court held that, as a matter of law, Cook was not
144 Id.
145 See Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001).
146 Id.
14 7 Id. at 591-92.
148 Id. at 590.
149 Id.150 Id. at 592.
151 Id.152 Id.
153 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
154 See Cook, 254 F.3d at 592.
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entitled to recover on the emotional distress claim. The court therefore
vacated the award. 1 55
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.' 5 6 The court reasoned that,
since parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements in any
manner they desire, that freedom includes contracting around the
extraordinarily narrow review usually available to a district court in the
arbitration context. 157 Any procedural rules adopted by the parties that add
rather than limit those provided by the FAA work to supplement the FAA
and would not be inconsistent with the terms of the arbitration agreement
itself.158 Speaking to plaintiffs' unconscionability argument, the court noted
that arbitration agreements are not per se unconscionable. 159 Rather, the
plaintiffs have the burden of proving unconscionability, since contracts of
adhesion are not automatically void. 160
E. The Case Against Expanding Review
In 2001, the Tenth Circuit concluded that parties to an arbitration
agreement are precluded from contractually altering the judicial standard of
review of an award.161 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.162 involved a dispute
by a landowner against a petroleum company that had been granted a
pipeline easement in 1918.163 Included in the easement agreement, ratified by
a second agreement in 1943, was an arbitration provision. 164 After
discovering that a creek on the property had been contaminated by oil
suspected to be originating in one of the defendant's pipelines, the
landowners sued in federal district court asserting claims for "damages to
real property, nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, breach of contract and
exemplary damages."' 165 Ironically, it was the defendant, Amoco Oil, who
filed the motion with the district court to stay the proceeding pursuant to the
arbitration agreement and order the dispute to arbitration.' 66 Before
155 1d.
156 Id. at 595.
157 Id. at 592-93.
158 Id. at 593.
159Id.
160 Id. at 593.
161 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
162 Id.
163 Id. at n.1.
1641d.
165 Id. at 928.
166 Id.
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proceeding with the court-ordered arbitration, the parties agreed both to use
the Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes and to
modify those rules to expand judicial review so that either party would have
the right to appeal the arbitration award to the district court within thirty
days. 167 The expanded grounds for appeal included review under the
standard that "the award is not supported by the evidence" and provided that
the decision of the district court would be final.' 68
The arbitration panel awarded plaintiffs over $4,000,000 dollars in
general damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.' 69 Amoco Oil then
filed an objection to the plaintiffs' motion to confirm the award, a motion to
vacate the award, and a notice of appeal of the arbitration award pursuant to
the modified arbitration agreement. 170 The federal district court, however,
limited its review to that provided under the FAA rather than the parties'
contractually-expanded standard of review, declined vacatur, and confirmed
the arbitral award. 171
After Amoco Pipeline appealed the district court's order, the plaintiffs
challenged review by the Tenth Circuit for lack of appellate jurisdiction
because the parties had contractually agreed that any decision of the district
court was final. 172 In determining its own appellate jurisdiction, the court
examined section 9 of the FAA and noted that this provision allows for
judicial intervention only where the parties have expressed their intentions
regarding judicial confirmation of the arbitration award in their arbitration
agreements. 173 The court found that, under this provision, it is possible for
parties to eliminate judicial review by their arbitration contract, but their
intention to do so must be clear and unequivocal. 174 The court reasoned that,
by statute, appellate courts derive jurisdiction to review "all final decisions of
the district courts."1 75 The court concluded that here, where the parties had





173 Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000)).
174 Id. at 931 (citing Dep't of Airforce v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 775 F.2d 727,
733 (6th Cir. 1985); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th
Cir. 1973)).
175 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
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agreed that the district court's decision would be final, the parties had merely
reaffirmed the appellate court's statutorily-derived jurisdiction. 176
The court then affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that
neither the purposes underlying the FAA nor the principles subsequently
announced in the various Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statute
supported a rule allowing parties to privately contract to alter the judicial
process. 177 The court held that a reviewing court may not vacate an
arbitration award except where so provided by the narrow circumstances
delineated in the FAA. 178 This is so, according to the court, because a central
purpose of arbitration agreements is to avoid the expense and delay involved
in litigating a claim in court. 179 Mindful of the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, the court noted that where parties consent to submit their claims
to arbitration "a party trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration."' 180
Although acknowledging the judicially recognized exception of "manifest
disregard of the law," the court stated that its interpretation of that term
meant "willful inattentiveness to the governing law,"' 181 where the arbitrators
knew the applicable law and explicitly disregarded it.182
The court acknowledged the arguments that first, the parties here freely
contracted for expanded judicial review by agreeing to the availability of
appeal under the grounds that the arbitration award was not supported by the
evidence; and second, that agreements in arbitration contracts are generally
supported by the policy of the FAA. 183 Although the court agreed that the
contractual nature of arbitration is well-established and that parties are free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they wish, the court nonetheless
declined to accept these arguments as controlling on these facts. 184 The court
noted that while the Supreme Court has emphasized that parties may
contractually specify which rules will govern their arbitration process, the
parties were not permitted to interfere with the judicial process. 185 Absent
176 Bowen, 254 F.3d at 931.
171 Id. at 933.
178 Id. at 932.
179 Id.
180 Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)).
181 Id. (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir.
1995)).
182 Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932.
183 Id. at 933.
184 Id. at 934.
185 Id. (citing LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir.
1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring and Mayer, J., dissenting)).
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any indication from the Supreme Court that clearly allows private parties to
determine the manner in which federal courts review arbitration awards, the
court reasoned that the explicit guidance provided by Congress in structuring
the FAA, to allow for only limited and specific areas of judicial review, must
control. 186
The court noted that the primary purpose of the FAA is to further the
policy of ensuring judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements. 187 The
limited judicial review provided for by the FAAwas deliberately designed to
ensure that courts would respect a decision of an arbitrator and not overturn it
except in the exceptional circumstances provided by statute. These limited
exceptions further the federal policy favoring arbitration by preserving the
independence of the process.
Furthermore, the court found that the statutory structure of the FAA
evidenced a Congressional intent that judicial review be limited to that
provided in the statute and not amendable by the will of the contracting
parties. 188 The court noted that while section 4 of the FAA 189 allows parties
to contract in their agreements for the ability to petition a federal court for an
order compelling arbitration, section 10, in contrast, contains no similar
language requiring federal courts to follow contractual provisions for
expanded judicial review. 190
In addition, the court noted that such expanded review would defeat the
benefits of arbitration by requiring arbitrators to generate written opinions
with conclusions of law and findings of fact. 191 Courts, unfamiliar with the
structure and procedure of arbitration, would be placed in an awkward
position of reviewing the creative and flexible remedies available to
arbitrators with experience and expertise very different from that of the
186 See id.
187 Id.
188 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
189 The mandatory language of 9 U.S.C. § 4 includes:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided
for in such agreement .... The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied
that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is
not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
190 Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935.
191 Id. at 936 n.7.
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judiciary applying traditional theories of remedy and equity in arriving at
final judgments. 192 Expanded judicial review, therefore, would threaten the
independence of arbitrators and blur the distinction between arbitration and
adjudication. 93
In holding that "parties may not interfere with the judicial process by
dictating how the federal courts operate," 194 the court acknowledged that it
was the first circuit to hold that parties may not contract for expanded
judicial review. 195  The Court did point out, however, that both the
Seventh196 and Eighth Circuits, 197 in dicta, have expressed disapproval of
expanded review by contract. 198
192 Id. at 936.
193 Id. (citing Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review
ofArbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 147, 151-52 (1997)).
194 Id. at n.8.
195 Id. at 936.
196 See generally Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc. 935
F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991). Where a party to an arbitration involving a dispute over
change in factory conditions under a "most favored nations" contract clause petitioned
district court review of the award, the appellate court affirmed both the district court's
confirmation of the award and the ability of the district court to review the award under
the Taft-Hartley Act. Id. Judge Posner, writing for the majority, determined that while it
was appropriate for the district court to review the award, the district court could not
substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator absent conditions of fraud or conflict of
interest. Id. In dicta, Posner commented:
[a]n agreement to submit a dispute over the interpretation of a labor or other contract
to arbitration is a contractual commitment to abide by the arbitrator's interpretation.
If the parties want, they can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the
arbitrator's award. But they cannot contract for judicial review of that award.
Id. at 1505.
197 See generally UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir.
1998). Although parties to an arbitration agreement did not contract for expanded judicial
review grounds, the losing party petitioned the district court to modify the award under
state statutory grounds. The court held that, because the arbitration agreement evidenced
no intent to the contrary, the FAA applied in this arbitration and that the only grounds
under which the award could be modified or vacated were those so provided for in the
FAA. The court addressed contractual expansion of vacatur and/or modification grounds
in dicta. The court noted that it is not clear
that parties have any say in how a federal court will review an arbitration award
when Congress has ordained a specific, self-limiting procedure for how such a
review is to occur... Congress did not authorize de novo review of such an award
on its merits; it commanded that when the exceptions do not apply, a federal court
has no choice but to confirm.
Id. at 997.
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In so holding, the Tenth Circuit discounted the importance of freedom to
contract and the inherently contractual nature of the arbitration process. The
court conceded the availability of a public policy exception to the general
rule against traditional limited judicial review where a court determines
"whether the specific terms contained in [the contract] violated public policy
by creating an explicit conflict with other laws and legal precedents."' 199 The
court stated, however, that the exception was inapplicable under the present
facts because it applies specifically and exclusively to contract disputes.
200
IV. ANALYSIS: THE LEGITIMACY OF CONTRACTUAL REVIEW
The resolution of the circuit split requires an analysis of the dispute that
pits the purpose of the FAA, to ensure enforcement of private arbitral
agreements, against the language of the statute that arguably precludes such
agreements when they involve expansion of judicial review standards. This
analysis reveals that enforcing these agreements is congruent with the
traditional American value of freedom of contract and with the purpose and
the structure of the FAA while still providing for the purity, independence,
and the very existence of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution
method.
A. Current Tension in the Law ofArbitration
The 2001 Bowen and Hughes Training circuit split demonstrates the
current tension in arbitration law. Many circuits interpret section 10 of the
FAA as merely a default provision that applies only where parties have failed
to provide for judicial review standards in private arbitral agreements. 201 The
Tenth Circuit, however, takes exactly the opposite stance, concluding that the
plain language of the statute itself, the legislative history of the FAA, and the
Although the court recognized that other Circuits had upheld such contractual
expansion in both Gateway and Lapine, the court was not prepared to accept that type of
contractual arrangement as valid. Id.
198 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001).
199 See id. at 932 n.3 (quoting Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020,
1024 (10th Cir. 1993)).
200 Id. at 932 n.3.
201 See Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001); Synchor Int'l
Corp. v. McLeland, CA-95-565-1, 1997 WL 452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997)
(unpublished); Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997);
Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Fils Et
Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
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avoidance of the evisceration of the process of arbitration as we know it in
the United States, requires that the statutory provisions in section 10
constitute the exclusive domain, with only a few judicially recognized
exceptions, of review of arbitration awards. 20 2
This split in the circuits can only lead to more uncertainty and less
willingness to submit claims to arbitration. This result is compounded by the
vastly different interpretations by the courts of the role of the FAA and the
Congressional intent behind section 10.203 The majority of circuits directly
confronting the issue consider the Supreme Court's broad view of the FAA's
legislative purpose, to treat arbitration agreements on equal footing with all
other contracts, as compelling the interpretation of section 10 as merely a
default provision that can be expanded contractually. 20 4 The Tenth Circuit, in
contrast, interprets section 10 as a definitive and limited compendium to be
expanded only where an arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the law in
making an award.205 Both sides articulate cogent reasoning in arriving at
opposite holdings. While both sides of the issue recognize the centrality of
the enforcement of private arbitration agreements as the driving force behind
the FAA and the very reason for its existence,206 it is the interpretation of
that purpose and its impact on section 10 that holds the key to the resolution
of the issue. The Fifth Circuit and those Circuits following it in the
Gateway/Lapine line of cases, honor parties arbitration agreements at any
price, even that of weakening the arbitral process, thereby relegating the
section 10 "judicial review" exceptions to mere default measures coming into
play only where parties fail to specify review standards in their
agreements.207 The Tenth Circuit, however, views the section 10 provisions
as vital to the structure and very nature of the arbitration process itself,
protecting the independence and purity of the arbitration process, in effect
"protecting" the process from interference by the judiciary and insuring that
except in the rarest of circumstances, an arbitrator's award will stand. 208
The question of which interpretation is correct centers not only on an
academic debate about the Congressional intent behind the FAA, but also on
what is practicable and acceptable to contracting parties in the Twenty-First
Century. The motivation leading parties to agree to submit disputes to
202 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001).
203 See supra Part III.
204 See Hughes, 254 F.3d 588; McLeland, 1997 WL 452245 at *6; Lapine, 130 F.3d
at 888; Gateway, 64 F.3d at 993; Midland Metals, 584 F. Supp. at 244.
205 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932.
206 See, e.g., id. at 934.
207 See Lapine, 130 F.3d at 888; Gateway, 64 F.3d at 987.
208 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936.
[Vol 18:1 20021
CONTRACTING AROUND THE FAA
arbitration rather than litigation as a means of resolution generally focuses on
the savings in cost, time, and complexity. 20 9 Too often, the finality of the
decision plus the risk that a party will not be the victor are not weighed as
factors when deciding to submit a dispute to arbitration. 210 When parties
recognize the risk factors, but value the benefits, creative participants have
altered the contractual process to expand both the statutory and non-statutory
grounds for judicial review in their agreements. Ironically, this result may
compromise one of the features that made arbitration attractive in the first
place, its finality.
The resolution of this particular tension in arbitration law requires a
process of statutory interpretation and an examination of the statutory history
of the FAA. In addition, the impact of contractual arrangements for expanded
judicial award review on the overall arbitration process must be analyzed.
B. Freedom of Contract Requires Enforcement of Review Agreements
All courts directly, examining the issue of enhanced judicial review by
arbitration contract acknowledge the importance of recognizing and giving
effect to the arbitration agreements of contracting parties. 211 Where the
courts differ, however, is in determining whether the language of the FAA,
on its face, precludes enforcement of contract clauses requiring judicial
review on grounds other than those provided by statute. 212 In balancing the
various considerations surrounding the controversy, and absent a statutory
prohibition, the freedom to contract privately as the parties see fit should
trump any contrary interests.
The law of contracts "permeates every aspect of society" affecting the
lives of American citizens from their employment, to the purchase of goods
they make from the fruits of that employment, to the insurance they buy to
protect the goods, to the mortgages of their homes. 213 In such an environment
it is difficult to imagine that this freedom to contract was not always
209 Hayford, supra note 11, at 498.
210 Id
211 See, e.g., Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934. This is required by the line of Supreme Court
authority emphasizing the contractual nature of arbitration. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at
57; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Volt, 489 U.S. at 498;
Dean Witter v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) ("The FAA's enactment was 'motivated, first
and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had
entered."'); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
212 See supra Part III.
213 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.3
(1998).
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available. Contract law was rudimentary in feudal England, however, with
courts refusing to enforce contracts because secular bargained-for
agreements were considered beneath the King's justice. 214 It was only when
England emerged from the medieval area to become a commercial center
with capitalistic underpinnings that freedom to contract became firmly
entrenched. 215 This revolutionary spirit defined emerging American law and
was prevalent in the 1920's milieu of the FAA. 2 16 Thus the notion of
freedom of contract permeates the structure and function of the FAA.217
It is well settled that the Congressional drafters contemplated the role of
the courts in the scheme of FAA-administered arbitration as one of an
enforcer of the contractual agreements of parties and the insurer of the
effectuation of that contract. 218 The preamble to the 1925 Act stated that it is
"[a]n Act [t]o make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements
for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transitions, or
commerce among the State or Territories or with nations. '219 Indeed, "as
drafted, the bill was understood by Members of Congress to 'simply provide
for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce an agreement in
commercial contracts and admiralty contracts.' "220 The Act recognized that
"arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract," and the bill was
structured to make the contracting party live up to the bargain. 221 To
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 The FAA reflects an intent to place arbitration agreements "upon the same
footing as other contracts" and to reverse judicial hostility to the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
217 See Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989); see also WARE,
supra note 49, at § 2.4 ("The FAA, enacted in 1925, is resolutely pro-contract.").
218 Hayford, supra note 11, at 500; Unnecessary Choice, supra note 9, at 2250
("parties dictate the terms of their own contracts, and the FAA does no more than ensure
that those terms are enforced."); see also Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 ("There is no federal
policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is
simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate."); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) ("The 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements' manifested by [9
U.S.C. § 2] and the Act as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of
private contractual arrangements: the Act simply 'creates a body of federal substantive
law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate."' (quoting
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 25 n.32
(1983)) (citation omitted)).
219 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1999).
220 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924) (remarks of Rep. Graham)).
221 H.R. 96, 68th Cong. (1st Sess. 1924).
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accomplish that goal, the bill provided a mechanism for enforcement in the
federal courts.
The legislative history provides important clues to the applicability of the
FAA to agreements for enhanced judicial review. The House Report
accompanying the bill to the floor emphasized the importance of
safeguarding the rights of the parties without judicial interference. 222 The
legislators expressed their concern that the federal law be streamlined and
simplistic, "reducing technicality, delay and expense to a minimum and at the
same time safeguarding the rights of the parties." 223 The legislators
emphasized that the FAA provided the "machinery . . . for the prompt
determination of [claims] for arbitration . . . without interference by the
court."
2 2 4
It seems likely, then, that the provision of "a hearing if the defeated party
contends that the award was secured by fraud or other corruption or undue
influence or . . . some evident mistake not affecting the merits . . . in the
award, '225 was included to protect the arbitration from uninvited judicial
interference. Thus, "mere error" was insufficient to trigger judicial review
unilaterally sought post-judgment by the losing party.
Such judicial interference is not a concern, however, where all
contracting parties invite judicial intervention in their arbitration process. A
contractual provision for expanded judicial review is consensual and
demonstrates the parties' willingness and desire for a reviewing court to
examine the proceeding and award for conformity to a standard selected by
the parties themselves. Hardly the judicial interference that the Act was
enacted in part to avoid, this review is simply another feature of the private
bargained-for arbitral agreement. Since neither party knows in advance who
will be the arbitral victor, the bargain benefits both and gives both the
reassurance they seek that an independent judicial examiner will scrutinize
proceedings for fairness and accuracy. This further examination not only
provides a safeguard for the rights of the parties, but also protects against
judicial interference beyond that so contracted. Such agreements for
expanded judicial review therefore are within the nature and intent of the
FAA.
Certainly in the hostile judicial atmosphere of 1925,226 the 68th Congress
could not foresee that a time would come where contracting parties would
222 Id.
223 Id. at 2.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
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desire judicial review of their award on the merits. Therefore, the FAA did
not anticipate or address the situation where parties agree that judicial review
of the award would proceed under standards other than those provided in the
Act. The language anticipates and prevents judicial interference but does not
preclude judicial review by invitation and contract.227
C. Supreme Court Favors Freedom of Contract in Arbitral
Agreements
The federal policy in favor of the freedom to contract for arbitration is so
strong that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the plain language of
the FAA requires courts to enforce the bargain of parties to arbitrate even
where the result is an inefficient use of the judicial system. 228 Even the
preemptive effect of the FAA is trumped by the parties' arbitration contract
to conduct their arbitrations under state law, as long as the state law
principles do not conflict with the prime directive underlying the FAA-that
agreements to arbitrate be enforced. 229
The overwhelming theme in recent Supreme Court cases is emphasis on
the enforcement of parties' arbitration agreements according to their
terms.230 For example, in Dean Witter v. Byrd,231 the Court examined the
discretionary abilities of the federal courts conferred by the FAA where a
disappointed investor filed suit in federal district court alleging various SEC
and state law violations. 232 When Dean Witter Reynolds filed a motion to
compel arbitration of the state claims and stay arbitration pending settlement
of the federal action, the Supreme Court examined the nature and the purpose
of the FAA in resolving the dispute. 233 The Court's reasoning provides
several insights into its understanding of the function of the various sections
of the FAA and the ability of a federal court to exercise discretion under the
Act. First, because the FAA mandates that district courts shall direct the
parties to arbitration where contractually agreed, under the plain language of
227 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999) (stating arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract").
228 See Dean Witter, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).
229 See generally Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (discussed
infra at notes 239-56 and accompanying text); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (discussed infra at notes 236-38 and accompanying text).
230 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 32-33 (1991); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
231 Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 213.
232 Id. at 214-16.
233 id. at 215.
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the Act, courts are required to enforce the parties' agreement even where
such enforcement possibly results in inefficiency by bifurcated proceedings
in different fora.234
By its terms, the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a
district court . . . [and] insofar as the language of the Act guides our
disposition of this case, we would conclude that agreements to arbitrate
must be enforced, absent a ground for revocation of the contractual
agreement. 235
The Court further emphasized that the FAA requires that agreements be
enforced according to their terms, even where state law otherwise precludes
such claims from arbitration, in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc.236 In Mastrobuono, the Court examined the issue of whether state law
prohibiting punitive damages in arbitration awards, deemed applicable by the
choice of law provision in an arbitration agreement, necessitated judicial
vacatur of such an award. 237 The Court held that the terms of parties' arbitral
contracts are controlling and that where an agreement includes punitive
damages issues among those to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures enforcement
even if state law otherwise excludes such claims from arbitration.
238
Perhaps the most definitive Supreme Court examination of the role of the
FAA in the enforcement of private arbitral agreements, whatever the form, is
found in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University.239 In Volt, a construction contract contained a
choice-of-law provision that the law of the location of the construction
governed. 240 When a dispute developed and one party sued the defendant and
others in state court, one of the third parties sought to stay the proceedings
and compel arbitration.241 The California Court of Appeals construed the
choice-of-law provision to mean that the parties intended that the California
rules of arbitration, not those provided in the FAA, govern their dispute
resolution.242 Because the California Civil Procedure Code provided that
third parties were not bound by arbitration agreements, the California Court
234 Id. at 218.
235 Id.
236 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 53.
239 Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
240 Id. at 470.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 471-72.
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of Appeals denied stay of litigation.243 The Supreme Court examined the
California rules and found that they were designed to encourage parties to
arbitrate disputes, thereby promoting the federal policy favoring
arbitration. 244 The Court therefore affirmed the state court holding that while
the FAA enforces arbitration agreements in interstate commerce disputes, it
does not preempt state law where the parties have agreed to be so bound. 245
The Court stated that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a
certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreement to arbitrate." 246
The Court, pointing to earlier holdings that the FAA ensures that agreements
will be enforced according to their terms, concluded that nothing in the FAA
prevents the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under procedural rules
different than those set forth in the Act itself.247
In so holding, the Court stressed the contractual nature of arbitration
agreements and the purpose of the FAA to enforce private arbitration
agreements.248 The FAA only preempts state laws where the application
would render arbitration agreements unenforceable. 249 The FAA does not
confer a right to compel arbitration at any time; "it only confers the right to
obtain an order directing that 'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in [the parties ] agreement."',250 Here, the parties had never agreed to require
arbitration to proceed in the manner of the FAA. 251
The Court noted that it previously held that sections one and two, the
substantive provisions of the FAA, are applicable in both state and federal
court because the principal purpose of Congress in the FAA is "ensuring that
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms." 252
Sections 3 and 4, in contrast, appear to only apply to federal court
proceedings. 253 Furthermore, "[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive
provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field
of arbitration." 254 Since the California rules were not an obstacle to the
243 Id. at 471.
244 Id.
245 See id. at 479.
246 Id. at 476.
247 Id. at 479.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 474-76 (emphasis added).
251 See id. at 479.
2 5 2 Id. at 476.
253 Id. at 477 n.6.
254 Id. at 477.
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purposes of Congress and did not conflict with federal law, they did not
undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. 255 The Court took a very pro-
private agreement stance, stating:
It does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate under different rules that those set forth in the Act itself...
Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties
are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.
Just as they may limit by contract the issues that they will arbitrate, so too
may they specify by contract the rules under which the arbitration will be
conducted . . . By permitting the courts to 'rigorously enforce' such
agreement according to their terms, we give effect to the contractual rights
and expatiations of the parties, without doing violence to the policies behind
the FAA. 2 5 6
The pro-private agreement Supreme Court philosophy, articulated in
Volt, has ramifications for the validity determination of the contractually
expanded judicial review controversy. Since expanded judicial review
provisions in parties' arbitration agreements are the result of a free and fair
bargained-for exchange, Volt indicates that so long as the primary policies of
the FAA (i.e., to prevent judicial interference in the arbitral process) maintain
their integrity, contractually expanded review is acceptable and enforceable
in the statutory scheme.
D. FAA Statutory Construction Permits Enhanced Contractual
Judicial Review
Even if the effectuation of the private arbitral contract requires that such
agreements for expanded judicial review be enforced, some argue that the
structure of the FAA itself may preclude such agreements from
effectuation. 257 Gateway and its progeny view section 10 as a default
provision that takes effect absent private contractual provisions to the
contrary.258 It could be argued, however, that in allowing enforcement of
such contractual provisions, the Gateway/Lapine courts do not address the
plain language of the FAA that specifies both when judicial intervention
comes is appropriate and exactly what form that intervention takes.
255 Id. at 479.
256 Id.
257 See Hayford, supra note 11, at 489.
258 Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.
1995).
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The FAA leaves no room for district court discretion in deciding whether
to enter a judgment based on an arbitral award.259 Judicial intervention can
only occur where parties have provided in their agreements that a court order
may be made to confirm any arbitral award. 260 Thus, it is the private
contractual agreement itself that provides the legal basis for federal court
involvement in the "back-end" of arbitration. 261
If the agreement provides for judicial intervention, the court must enter
an order confirming the award. 262 The court, in that circumstance, can only
exercise discretion in vacating, modifying, or correcting the award where
existing circumstances fall within the narrow exceptions circumstances
described in sections 10 and 11.263
Section 10 of the FAA enumerates those circumstances in which "the
United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration. ' 264 This permissive language is repeated in section 1I dealing
with modification of awards, but stands in sharp contrast to mandatory
directives elsewhere in the statute commanding a court, for instance, that it
must grant an order confirming an arbitration award where parties have so
agreed. 265 Thus, under section 10, a district court is not compelled to vacate
an award even under the plain language of the statute. Most notably,
Congress has never expressly authorized courts to review arbitral awards
under the standards devised by parties in private arbitration agreements. 266
Certainly the FAA does not require courts to review arbitrators' legal rulings
or substantive awards. The issue, then, becomes whether the FAA permits
the private contract of the parties to compel a court of jurisdiction to review
an award using standards specified in the contract.
Keeping in mind the underlying FAA policy of preventing judicial
interference in the arbitral structure, 26 7 the strict construction of sections 9,
259 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
260 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13.
261 See WARE, supra note 49, at § 2.40 ("Judicial enforcement of arbitration awards
is an example of courts enforcing contracts. The parties agreed to comply with the
arbitrator's decision and if a party refuses to do so then that party is in breach of
contract.").
262 Id.
263 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2000).
264 9 U.S.C. § 10 (emphasis added).
265 See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
266 WARE, supra note 17, at 735.
267 For a general discussion of arbitral autonomy in the employment setting, see
Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual
Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REv. 687,
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10 and 11 makes sense. Federal district courts cannot enter the process sua
sponte unless invited by the parties, and once invited, cannot undermine that
process by vacating or modifying an award on the merits. Sections 9, 10 and
11, however, only delineate those areas where a court may interfere in the
arbitral process on its own volition.268 Nowhere do the sections prevent
parties from agreeing to involve the court in the process by seeking judicial
review of the award on standards devised by the parties. Nor does such an
arrangement do. "violence to the policies behind the FAA. ' 269 A textual
reading of the FAA in this light does not prevent enforcement of parties'
agreements to enhanced judicial review., Section 10, therefore, is a default
provision that only takes effect where parties agree to judicial confirmation
by court order recognizing arbitral awards, but where the agreement does not
include specific standards for judicial review.
E. Judicial Integrity not Undermined by Contractual Review
Expansion
Even if the FAA is interpreted as allowing for the enforcement of private
contracts for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards, some jurists,
including the Tenth Circuit Bowen majority, bristle at the proposition that the
courts are at the mercy of the private contract of a party and that a party can
compel a court to act by merely agreeing to such action in a contract. 270
Perhaps these courts see such agreements as a threat to their current
preference for alternate dispute resolution tools as a means to encourage
settlements and reduce their own workloads.271
Admittedly, the courts are public institutions designed to serve a public
function, and private litigants' requests for non-traditional judicial
intervention may pose a threat to the integrity of the judicial institution,
especially where standards of review contracted for in a private agreement
are beyond those with which the court is familiar. The Bowen court
expressed concern that the tools of the arbitrator are unfamiliar to the court
and that "expanded judicial review places federal courts in the awkward
position of reviewing proceedings conducted under potentially unfamiliar
745-49 (1997); R. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law: Individual
Autonomy and the Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous.
L. REv. 1863, 1865-66 (1994).
268 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (2000).
269 See Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
270 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001).
271 See generally Sarah R. Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of
Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000).
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rules and procedures." 27 2 Courts that perform contractually-expanded review
could potentially find themselves in areas of unfamiliarity where arbitrators
with particularized expertise in a discrete area fashion novel and flexible
remedies unavailable in traditional litigation. 273
Circuit courts directly deciding the enforceability of enhanced judicial
review have arrived at three different responses. 274 The Gateway court
upheld the validity of private arbitral agreements providing for expanded
judicial review while not addressing the issue of the propriety of private
agreements directing the court's role in arbitral award vacatur and/or
modification. 275 The Bowen court, in contrast, found that expanded judicial
review threatened both the institution of the courts and the independence of
arbitration and weakened the distinction between the two systems. 276 A
middle ground was struck in the LaPine concurrence, which justified private
encroachment on the public judicial domain by reasoning that what the
district federal court was being asked to do under enhanced review was not
unlike the work it performs in review of bankruptcy and administrative
decisions.277 As long as the parties' arbitral agreement included traditional
standards with which courts are familiar, such as review of errors of law and
fact, no unreasonable encroachment on the judiciary institution was found.278
While it is undeniable that courts need a reliable and consistent
framework on which to base their decisions, thus far parties have asked
courts to review arbitral awards using traditional standards such as for errors
of law or fact.279 Although the freedom for parties' stipulation of terms of
arbitral agreements is as broad as the independence to choose idiosyncratic
terms in any contract, 280 where parties involve the judiciary, respect for
272 See Bowen, 254 F,3d at 934, 936.
273 Id.
274 See Cole, supra note 271, at 1250-53.
275 See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.
1995).
276 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934, 936.
277 See Lapine v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
278 Id. at 890.
279 See, e.g., Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997 (enforcing arbitration agreement in which
parties agreed that any disputes arising from their joint business venture would be
arbitrated with de novo judicial review of errors of law).
280 See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
Judge Posner, commenting on the freedom of parties to construct arbitration agreements
as they wish, noted:
Indeed, short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel
of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern
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tradition and the institution itself are important considerations. The LaPine
concurrence, combining both the policy of the FAA of party autonomy in
fashioning agreements and the recognition of judicial stature and the integrity
of the institution of the courts, is a valid compromise in enforcing agreements
that provide for enhanced judicial review.281 Thus, like so much else in the
law, parties are free to agree for expanded review within reason. In
structuring their arbitration, they can choose to avoid the courts completely.
They can devise a procedure completely independent of judicial interference
or review of their award. But, if they choose to involve the courts in the
confirmation and review of the arbitration award, the standards they choose
for that review must be reasonable and applicable within the traditional
structure of the judiciary.282
Another argument against enhanced judicial review by arbitral contract is
that the FAA only confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to review
arbitral awards as specified in the statute.283 It is well settled, however, that
the FAA does not confer jurisdiction on the courts, but a federal district court
may only enforce an arbitral agreement where an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction exists.284 Thus, the power of the federal court to act
derives either from diversity or a federal question. The court, therefore, has
the power to review under expanded grounds if provided for in the bargain of
the parties. 285
F. Protecting the Integrity of the Arbitral Process
The Bowen court encapsulated the seminal issue for determination in
analyzing the validity of private arbitral agreements expanding judicial
review as whether the alternate scheme conflicts with federal policies
furthered by the FAA.286 The court concluded that "[t]he FAA's limited
judicial review ...prevents courts from enforcing parties' agreements to
arbitrate only to refuse to respect the results of the arbitrations." 287
the arbitration of their disputes; parties are as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of
arbitration as they are to specify any other terms in their contract.
Id.
281 See supra Part III-C.
282 Id.
283 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934-35 (10th Cir. 2001).
284 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
285 See Lapine v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
286 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-35.
287 Id.
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Furthermore, "the FAA standards manifest a legislative intent to further the
federal 'policy favoring arbitration by preserving the independence of
arbitration" and the finality of the award. 288 The court cited practical
impediments to the arbitral process arising from expanded judicial review,
including increased district court dockets and practical problems with
reviewing in the absence or dearth of arbitrators' findings of fact and
conclusions of law. 289
Although the Gateway/Lapine line of cases view such contractual clauses
as alternatives to the default provisions of section 10,290 it can be argued that
these expansion clauses weaken the position of the arbitrator's decision as a
final, binding, and judicially enforceable award. Accordingly, private
agreements for expanded judicial review may eventually destroy the process
of arbitration. Such an interpretation of section 10 as a default provision,
effective only where judicial review standards are not otherwise alternatively
contracted, can therefore be viewed as inconsistent with the FAA itself,
because the FAA was enacted to ensure enforcement of arbitration
agreements effectuating a federal policy favoring arbitration. 291
The FAA was enacted to combat three "evils" all related to inefficiency:
delay in finality of litigation, expense of litigation, and the failure of
litigation to arrive at decisions considered "just" in the business world. 292
Thus, while enacted to promote freedom of contract in the arbitration setting,
the FAA was structured to effectuate the process of arbitration because of its
benefits, especially in commercial dispute resolution.293 It makes sense, then,
that the drafters created the legislation to further all of these goals. While
parties are free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit,
protecting the purity of the arbitration process from judicial intervention and
routine vacatur of awards can ensure the vitality of the process. If section 10
is ultimately interpreted as merely a default provision where parties may
contract around the enforceability of substantive law, the legal standard of
care may soon provide for arbitration agreement drafts routinely including
expanded review options. Consequently, arbitration would no longer be an
288 Id.
289 Id.
2 90 See, e.g., Lapine, 130 F.3d at 890.
291 See, e.g., Dean Witter v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (The FAA's enactment
was "motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into
which parties had entered.").
292 Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review in
Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REv. 395, 424 (1998).
293 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 531 U.S. 105, 125 (2001) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924) (remarks of Rep. Graham)); cf Gateway
Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995).
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alternative to litigation, but merely another version of the initial fact-finding
trial court in the costly and time-consuming journey up the judicial appellate
ladder.294
Additionally, keeping within the "freedom to contract" construct of the
FAA, creative parties can explore alternatives to judicial review if
uncomfortable with the finality of an arbitrator's award. One proposed
solution is that parties can agree to parameters for arbitral awards. 295
Analogous to a "high-low" award in a civil suit, such parameters work in that
an award made outside the limits would have no effect. 296 Shielding the
arbitrator from knowledge of the limitation ensures independence of the
process.297
Another alternative, suggested by several circuit courts, is review by an
arbitral appellate panel under standards designated by the arbitration
agreement. 298 Panel utilization avoids those criticisms of judicial arbitral
review that center on the unfamiliarity of the courts with the arbitral process,
especially with the flexibility in remedies, the inability of a reviewing court
to remand the case to the now-disbanded fact finding panel, and the
impracticality of a re-arbitration of complex procedures that take years to
complete. 299 Arbitration review boards provide the expertise and familiarity
to provide some measure of review to parties reluctant to submit to the
finality of arbitration. 300 Rather than entangling the courts in reviewing the
merits of challenged arbitral awards, appellate arbitral review panels merely
add a second level to the contractual arbitral procedure so that losing parties
may secure a degree of protection from the risk of an award they perceive to
be unjust.30 1 Optional internal arbitral appellate review with the arbitral
system is already established by some organization rules including the CPR
Arbitration Appeal Procedure and the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration
Rules and Procedures. 30 2
294 Karon A. Sasser, Freedom to Contract for Expanded Judicial Review in
Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REv. 337, 364 (2001).
295 Cullinan, supra note 292, at 427.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001); Chicago
Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).
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These arguments, however, fail to consider that any problems
encountered by expanded judicial review are created by the agreement of the
parties themselves, are anticipated by the parties, and are addressed in the
parties' agreement. Presumably, parties will contract for expanded judicial
review only after balancing the benefits and burdens so associated. Parties
desiring finality and speed will not opt for enhanced review. If they want
"instant justice," they presumably won't contract for expanded review. Since
reasoned awards are necessary for judicial review, the parties will provide in
their agreements that the proceedings will be recorded and the arbitrator will
generate such a report.
Any time judicial review is expanded, additional burdens and problems
must be expected. In this case, however, the burdens are outweighed by the
benefits. Providing increased options for expanded review means that
arbitration will become more appealing to disputing parties. No longer
deterred by a perception of arbitration as "frontier justice," parties will be
more willing to submit disputes to this alternative resolution method. Any
increase in the court docket created by the contracted-for review of arbitral
awards will be offset by the increasing number of disputing parties
submitting the fact-finding portion of their claim resolution to arbitration
rather than to the courts. Lengthy district court involvement in pre-trial
judicial case management and the trial fact-finding phase of a dispute will be
replaced with less time-intensive case review. The net effect of recognizing
the validity of arbitral agreements for expanded judicial review will be that
courts have less work than under the traditional FAA regime.303 In addition,
depending on how costs are allocated in the arbitral contract, arbitration with
expanded review is still likely to be much cheaper than litigation, both for the
parties and the courts.
Providing a "middle ground" between traditional arbitration and full-
blown litigation, arbitration with expanded judicial review can be a viable
option to parties who anticipate the increased expense and time involved but
who value a reasoned and correct decision over instant justice. In many
settings, parties might have legitimate reasons for preferring instant decisions
to those that are judicially reviewed. In the employment context, for
example, arbitration is a popular dispute resolution method precisely for that
reason.304 If the employee wins or the award calls for discipline other than
discharge, the employee can be back on the job within weeks to a few
303 See Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240,
244 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that arbitration with expanded review results in less work
for the court than full-blown litigation).
304 See BALES, supra note 1, at 153-54.
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months after the dispute arose. 305 In a contractarian paradigm, courts will
respect the parties' desire for finality over reviewabilty and vice-versa.
G. Judicial Review and the Expanding Scope ofArbitration
An obvious area of concern where judicial review of arbitration awards
is limited to traditional FAA review is the fear of a denial of the parties'
rights where arbitrators apply the wrong law but the error falls short of
"manifest disregard" or other vacatur grounds, Currently, in the arbitration
setting, "[t]he court is forbidden to substitute its own interpretation even if
convinced that the arbitrator's interpretation was not only wrong, but plainly
wrong."306
Until recently, many claims were inarbitrable. For years, arbitration was
limited to commercial and labor disputes. 30 7 In the past twenty-five years,
however, Supreme Court decisions have resulted in an unprecedented
expansion of arbitration into areas previously considered off-limits. 308 The
Court has concluded, for example that many new types of claims, including
those involving antitrust3 09 and securities law310 are arbitratable upon private
agreement. Most notably, valid agreements to arbitrate employment disputes
involving statutory claims will be enforced. 31' At least one commentator has
suggested that these recent Supreme Court decisions have transformed
arbitration into merely another trial court of general jurisdiction.312 It is
argued that these decisions, compounded by a dearth of reasoned awards
accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law, a lack of transcripts
of arbitration proceedings, and the limited judicial review allowed by the
FAA, compel the limitation of arbitration to commercial and labor issues.3 13
305 Id. at 160.
306 Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505
(7th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
307 Ware, supra note 17, at 712.
308 Id. at 712-13.
309 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
310 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The
Supreme Court held that agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Exchange
Act were arbitrable because "although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily
is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute." Id. at 232.
311 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
312 WARE, supra note 17, at 715.
313 Id.
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Legislation to limit the scope of the FAA to exclude employment
contracts has been proposed in almost every session of Congress since
Gilmer. Some courts314 have'expressed reservations concerning the limited
scope of judicial review in arbitrations of statutory claims, especially where
such claims are deeply rooted in public policy (e.,g., employment
discrimination). Permitting parties to agree to an expanded scope of judicial
review may help alleviate, though not eliminate, such concerns.
Perhaps one answer is that the FAA, which has worked well for over
three-quarters of a century, is antiquated in the current era of expansive
arbitration application. A closer examination of the FAA, however, shows
that although the statute precludes judicial intervention sua sponte,315
enhanced judicial involvement pursuant to an agreement between the parties
is both permissible and desirable, effectuating the policies that the FAA was
intended to promote.
V. CONCLUSION
The FAA, enacted in 1925 to ensure the judicial enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate, has remained essentially unchanged to date,
governing all contracts to arbitrate disputes involving commerce and
maritime transactions. 316 Courts, addressing what effect should be given to
contractual provisions for judicial review expanded beyond the very narrow
circumstances contemplated by the FAA, are split as to whether the freedom
to contract trumps the benefits of arbitration effectuated by the section 10
limitations. The current tension in the law creates uncertainty for parties
attracted to the simplicity and cost-effectiveness of arbitration but who desire
judicial recourse if the result is one they perceive to be unfair.
The FAA was enacted in an atmosphere of judicial hostility and
reluctance to enforce private contractual arbitration agreements. 317 The
Gateway/Lapine reasoning, which emphasizes the importance of the freedom
to contract for expanded judicial review, is consistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FAA as ensuring that parties may structure their
3 14 See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding, in
age discrimination case, that an arbitration panel "manifestly disregarded the law or the
evidence or both."); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("[T]he strict deference accorded to arbitration decisions in the collective
bargaining arena may not be appropriate in statutory cases in which an employee has
been forced to resort to arbitration as a condition of employment.").
315 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
316 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
317 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (noting Congressional intent to reverse judicial
hostility to enforcing arbitration agreements).
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arbitration agreements in any way they deem fit.318 In addition, the structure
of that part of the FAA dealing with the "back-end" issues of confirming
arbitral awards with judgment orders protects parties from uninvited judicial
interference into the arbitral process. Conversely, private agreements for
enhanced judicial review contemplate, anticipate, and contract for judicial
review of arbitral awards based on standards provided by the parties rather
than sua sponte judicial interference and are therefore not precluded by either
the FAA or its underlying policy.
Even though 'arbitrations with enhanced judicial review might involve
more time and expense than those dispensing "instant justice," this construct
provides a middle ground between traditional arbitration and litigation,
thereby sparing judicial resources at the fact-finding phase. Any increase in
judicial docket because of a higher number of appeals will be offset by
greater numbers of potential litigants turning to the now more attractive
forum of arbitration for dispute resolution. The purity, independence, and the
very existence of arbitration can still be guaranteed by a more liberal view of
section 10 as interpreted by the non-statutory exceptions currently recognized
in case law. Following the directives of the FAA by recognizing and
enforcing private arbitral contracts, for example, can only improve the
overall process of arbitration.
318 See supra Part IV B-C.
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